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ABSTRACT
We propose a theory of international agreements on product standards. The key feature of
the model is that agreements are viewed as incomplete contracts. In particular, these do not specify
standards for products that may arise in the future. One potential remedy to contractual
incompleteness is a dispute settlement procedure (DSP) that provides arbitration in states of the
world that are not covered by the ex ante agreement. We identify conditions under which a DSP can
provide ex-ante efficiency gains, and examine how these gains depend on the fundamentals of the
problem. Another potential remedy to contractual incompleteness is given by rigid rules, i.e. rules
that are not product-specific. We argue that the nondiscrimination rule is the only rule of this kind
that increases ex ante efficiency for any probability distribution over potential products. Finally we
show that, under relatively weak conditions, the optimal ex-ante agreement is structured in three
parts: (i) a set of clauses that specify standards for existing products; (ii) a rigid nondiscrimination
rule, and (iii) a dispute settlement procedure. Although the model focuses on the case of product
standards, the analysis suggests a more general incomplete-contracting theory of trade agreements.
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I nt h el a s tf e wd e c a d e s ,t a r i ﬀs have been dramatically reduced throughout the world trading
system, however the same cannot be said for nontariﬀ barriers to trade. Product standards
—d e ﬁned here as government-imposed constraints on the characteristics of products sold in
national markets — are one potential source of these nontariﬀ impediments. There is plenty of
anecdotal evidence that this issue is quantitatively important.1 The concern about the potential
protectionistic misuse of product standards prompted the GATT-WTO members to sign two
special agreements, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade in 1979, and the Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in 1994. Also the NAFTA agreement devoted special
attention to the issue of product standards. As a further sign of the growing importance of this
issue, the WTO has considered as many as 25 disputes regarding technical barriers to trade
just in the period between 1995 and 2000.
In this paper we propose a theory of international agreements on product standards. The
central feature of our theory is that such agreements are viewed as incomplete contracts. In
reality, it is hard to dispute that the existing agreements on product standards are highly
incomplete. One manifestation of this incompleteness is that the agreements say very little
about standards for products that may arise in the future, whereas a complete agreement would
specify standards for all potential future products.2 Our main objective is to convince the reader
that by adopting an incomplete-contracting persp e c t i v ew ec a nh e l pe x p l a i ni m p o r t a n ta s p e c t s
1Here we mention two examples of this evidence. Cecchini et al. (1988) conducted extensive surveys of busi-
ness executives in Europe on the importance of nontariﬀ barriers for intra-European trade. Survey respondents
from France, Germany and the United Kingdom ranked product standards as the most important source of
trade impediments. As Sykes (1995) notes, one has to be cautious when making inferences about the world as
a whole from the European experience, but it seems likely that technical barriers in the world at large are even
more signiﬁcant than in pre-1992 Europe, also considering that the EC had already pursued several initiatives
directed at product standards at that time. There is also a growing number of sectoral studies on the trade
eﬀect of product standards. One example is Otsuki et al. (2001), who focus on standards on aﬂatoxins imposed
by the EU on food imports from African countries. They estimate that the EU standard would reduce health
risks by only about 1.4 deaths per billion a year but would cut African exports by 64 percent, or US$670 million,
compared with their level under international standards.
2Robert Hudec describes the diﬃculties faced by the original GATT drafters when trying to design rules on
domestic standards as follows (1990, p.24): “...The standard trade policy rules could deal with the common types
of trade policy measure governments usually employ to control trade. But trade can also be aﬀected by other
‘domestic’ measures, such as product safety standards, having nothing to do with trade policy. It would have
b e e nn e x tt oi m p o s s i b l et oc a t a l o g u ea l ls u c hp o s s i b i l i t i e si na d v a n c e . ...”of the observed agreements.
We start by sketching the structure of our model. We consider a two-country world where
each government chooses product standards to maximize national welfare. The resulting non-
cooperative equilibrium is ineﬃcient, and thus an international agreement is called for. Agree-
ments are enforceable and can cover existing products, but not future potential products. When
a new product arises, governments can bargain eﬃciently over the standards for the new prod-
uct, thus the outcome is ex-post eﬃcient. However, due to contractual incompleteness, the
outcome is ineﬃcient from an ex-ante perspective. This ineﬃciency can be understood as miss-
ing issue linkage. Suppose governments could bargain ex ante over future potential products,
and think about each potential product as a distinct “bargaining issue.” Then the ex ante
bargain would link these issues across states of the world. This linkage is missing if a complete
contingent contract is not available.
We examine two potential remedies to the incompleteness of agreements: ﬁrst, a dispute
settlement mechanism that provides arbitration in states of the world that are not covered by
the ex ante agreement, and second, the use of rigid rules, that is constraints on policy that are
not product-speciﬁc and are not contingent on the state of the world.
The idea that a dispute settlement procedure (DSP) can help remedy the incompleteness
of agreements has been expressed informally by several scholars. For example, Dixit (1996)
writes: “...All feasible contracts are necessarily incomplete. Therefore, ex post institutions
(dispute settlement mechanisms) are very important.”3 Our model allows us to examine this
idea more rigorously. In particular, we will analyze the conditions under which a DSP can
provide a Pareto-improvement for the participating countries, and examine how the gains from
such a system depend on the fundamentals of the problem.
We think of the DSP as an arbitrator. Each government can invoke the DSP during the
negotiation process, in which case the DSP’s decision is binding on both parties. Thus the DSP
inﬂuences the outcome of the ex-post bargaining game by aﬀecting the governments’ outside
3Other economists who have made similar statements are Ethier (2001) and Kovenock and Thursby (1993). It
is interesting, however, that this view of the DSP as ﬁlling the gaps of incomplete agreements is more common
among international law scholars than among economists. See for example Joel Trachtman (1999) and the
references therein.
2options. The ex-ante agreement speciﬁes the principle that guides the DSP in its decisions. In
our setting, it is natural to assume that this principle is the maximization of the countries’ joint
welfare, which is what governments would do if they could write a complete contingent contract.
The arbitration process however is imperfect, because the state of the world — assumed known
to both governments — is imperfectly veriﬁable to the DSP.
In spite of the fact that governments bargain eﬃciently and have more information than
t h eD S P ,w es h o wt h a tt h ep r e s e n c eo ft h eD S Pc a ni m p r o v ee x - a n t ee ﬃciency, provided the
imperfection in its information is not too serious. The basic logic of the result is the following.
The ineﬃciency due to contract incompleteness ultimately consists in selecting the “wrong”
point on the ex-post bargaining frontier in each state of the world. The DSP can partially
remedy this ineﬃciency by inﬂuencing the ex-post bargaining outcome, which in turn can be
achieved by oﬀering an appropriate outside option to the bargainers. For this mechanism to
work, however, the DSP needs information: achieving an eﬃcient outcome requires shifting the
ex-post distribution of utilities by the “right” amount, which in turn requires knowing the state
of the world. Since the state of the world is imperfectly veriﬁable, the DSP cannot achieve full
eﬃciency, but if the DSP has enough information its presence is nonetheless beneﬁcial.
The potential gains from arbitration are larger when the ex-post bargaining situation is ex-
pected to be more asymmetric. This is because, if ex-post bargaining is more asymmetric, there
are larger gains from linking issues across states of the world, and hence contract incompleteness
creates a more serious ineﬃciency. Also, arbitration has a role to play only if the governments’
utilities are nontransferable. If pure international transfers are available, the incompleteness of
t h ee x - a n t ea g r e e m e n td o e sn o tc a u s ea n yi n e ﬃciency.
We emphasize that the DSP in our model plays a very diﬀe r e n tr o l et h a ni nm o s te x i s t i n g
models of the DSP (e.g. Hungerford, 1991, Kovenoch and Thursby, 1993, Maggi, 1999). In these
models, the DSP is desirable only if it can increase the severity of punishments for violations
of the agreements. In our model the DSP is not concerned with punishments for past actions,
but tries to implement more eﬃcient policies for the future. Also, in the previous models any
“out of court” settlement by governments is undesirable, as this undermines the punishment
mechanism. In our model, out-of-court settlement is desirable. Thus, our model rationalizes
3an institution that facilitates genuine dispute settlement, rather than retaliation.
Next we focus on rigid rules as a potential remedy to contractual incompleteness. A promi-
nent example of rigid rule is the nondiscrimination (ND) rule. In our two-country model, this
takes the form of a “national-treatment” rule, which requires a country to apply the same stan-
dard to imported and domestically produced units of a given good. As a ﬁrst step, we consider
the eﬀects of the ND rule abstracting from the possibility of a DSP. Imposing the ND rule
is not suﬃcient to implement the ﬁrst best outcome, however we show that this rule has the
desirable property of increasing ex-ante eﬃciency for any probability distribution over potential
products. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the ND rule is the only feasible rigid rule that satisﬁes
this property.
Based on the above considerations, we single out the ND rule as the only candidate rigid
rule, and examine under what conditions it is desirable to combine it with a dispute settlement
procedure. We show that, under some plausible conditions on the quality of the DSP’s infor-
mation, a combination of DSP and ND rule is indeed the best option. In sum, the optimal
ex-ante agreement has three components: (i) a set of clauses that specify standards for existing
products; (ii) a rigid nondiscrimination rule, and (iii) a dispute settlement procedure.
S i n c ew ef o c u so nt h ea g r e e m e n tt h a tm a x i m i z e se x - a n t ee ﬃciency, the direct interpreta-
tion of our theory is in normative terms (how should an agreement on product standards be
designed?). However, we believe that the theory also has some positive explanatory power.
In the last section of the paper we will argue that the predictions of the model are broadly
consistent with the approach adopted by the WTO and NAFTA on product standards. At a
minimum, it is safe to say that the observed agreements are very diﬀerent from what a complete-
contracting model would predict, and introducing an incomplete-contracting perspective takes
the theoretical predictions closer to reality.
Although in this paper we focus on the issue of product standards, the model suggests a
more general incomplete-contracting theory of trade agreements. Our analysis of the DSP is
fairly general, and should apply to a wide set of trade-relevant policies. The other general
insight is that an incomplete-contracting approach can explain the presence of rigid rules in
trade agreements. The basic idea is that rigid rules can enhance ex-ante eﬃciency by aﬀecting
4the status quo in ex-post negotiations. Of course, characterizing the optimal rigid rules is
inevitably a policy-speciﬁc exercise. But we think the theoretical framework presented here
suggests a useful method for studying agreements in other policy areas.
Next we discuss the related literature. Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) examine a model with
two countries and two homogenous goods, where governments choose standards and import
tariﬀs. A standard is modeled as a parameter that shifts the import demand curve, and hence
exerts an international externality only through terms of trade. Bagwell and Staiger show
that globally eﬃcient outcomes can be achieved through a tariﬀ agreement complemented by
the following market-access rule: after the tariﬀ agreement is signed, each country can change
its standards and tariﬀs subject to the constraint that the market access levels implied by
the tariﬀ agreement be preserved. The main diﬀerence between our model and Bagwell and
Staiger’s is that we focus on the potential remedies to contractual incompleteness. We note that
market-access rules àl aBagwell and Staiger cannot remove the ineﬃciency due to contractual
incompleteness, because the eﬃcient level of market access is product-speciﬁc, thus it cannot
be speciﬁed ex ante for future potential products. Another important diﬀerence is that in our
model the international externality associated with product standards does not travel simply
through terms of trade, thus it is not clear that a market-access rule can achieve eﬃcient
outcomes even for existing products. We will come back to this issue in section 4, where we
focus on the implications of tariﬀsi no u rm o d e l . 4
Fischer and Serra (2001) develop a model of product standards that is similar to ours, except
that markets are oligopolistic rather than competitive. They show that if a national-welfare-
maximizing government chooses standards in a noncooperative way, the resulting standard
levels will be ineﬃcient from a global point of view, even if standards are constrained to satisfy
national treatment (a result that is fully consistent with our analysis). Fischer and Serra do not
consider international agreements on product standards, which is the main focus of our paper.
Other papers on product standards include Sturm (2000), who examines how political-economy
4Also Ederington (2001) considers a model where governments choose tariﬀs and domestic policies, and the
latter impose international externalities only through terms of trade. He focuses on the optimal self-enforcing
agreement, and shows that the presence of a self-enforcement constraint implies a distortion in tariﬀsr e l a t i v et o
their ﬁrst-best level (zero), but not in the domestic policy levels. He interprets this ﬁnding as explaining why
the GATT forbids the use of domestic policies as “disguised restrictions to trade,” while it allows positive tariﬀ
levels.
5factors can lead to ineﬃcient choices of product standards, and Gandal and Shy (2001) and
Klimenko (2003), who focus on compatibility standards in the presence of network externalities.5
Our paper is also related to Ethier (2001). Although this paper does not focus speciﬁcally
on product standards, it has some similarities with our paper, namely the idea that trade
agreements are incomplete, and that the DSP intervenes when an unforeseen contingency arises.
Ethier’s model of the DSP however is very diﬀerent from ours. For example, in Ethier’s model
the DSP is equivalent to a ﬁxed rule which speciﬁes that, if a country takes a trade-related
action that reduces the eﬀective degree of trade liberalization, the injured country can retaliate
with a proportional tariﬀ increase after a ﬁxed amount of time. In contrast, the DSP in our
model is a genuine arbitrator that, if invoked, gathers information and maximizes an objective
function. The two papers diﬀer also in other important respects; for example, we examine the
role of rigid rules and their interaction with the DSP, while Ethier does not.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the basic model,
focusing on the complete-contracting benchmark; in section 3 we extend the model to allow for
contract incompleteness; in section 4 we discuss the robustness of the model to some extensions;
in section 5 we discuss the empirical relevance of our model.
5Somewhat related to our work is also Bagwell and Staiger (1999), which proposes an eﬃciency explanation
for the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule in tariﬀ negotiations. Bagwell and Staiger show that, if the MFN rule
is used in concert with the rule of reciprocity, the outcome of tariﬀ negotiations is a point on the Pareto frontier
(the “politically-optimal” outcome) that is deﬁned without reference to the governments’ negotiating powers.
They then argue that, if production requires irreversible investment (sunk costs), a system based on these rules
may be preferred ex-ante not only by weaker countries but also by powerful countries, because it encourages
weaker countries to participate in the agreement. Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) points out another eﬃciency
rationale for the MFN rule. This paper considers a multi-country world where bilateral tariﬀ negotiations exert
negative externalities on third countries and show that imposing MFN and reciprocity on bilateral negotiations
helps preserve the welfare of third countries, and hence increases ex-ante eﬃciency.
6Our model is broadly related with the literature on investment hold-up (see Hart, 1995, and the references
therein). The common theme is that the incompleteness of contracts generates an ex-ante ineﬃciency, and that
this ineﬃciency can be removed by a suitable reshaping of the parties’ ex-post bargaining positions (see for ex-
ample Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995, who argue that the use of option contracts can serve this purpose). However
in our model the nature of the ex-ante ineﬃciency is diﬀerent, because we do not have ex-ante investment de-
cisions; we only have ex-ante uncertainty on the ex-post state of the world. If we introduced (non-contractible)
ex-ante investments in our setting, this would add a second layer of ineﬃciency in the outcome. Finally we
should mention the literature on labor arbitration (e.g. Crawford, 1979, Farber, 1980, Gibbons, 1988). The
similarity between these models and ours is that the presence of an arbitrator inﬂuences the outcome of the ne-
gotiation between two parties, but the structure of the game is quite diﬀerent. More importantly, these models
do not explain the role of arbitration. They simply postulate the presence of an arbitrator with an (exoge-
nously speciﬁed) objective function, and study its implications on the outcome of negotiations. In particular,
contractual incompleteness plays no role in explaining the role of arbitration in this literature.
62. The basic model
Consider two countries, Home and Foreign. Asterisks denote the foreign country. In each
country there is a population of identical citizens which is a continuum of measure L.E a c h
citizen owns one unit of labor. We assume that L is large enough that every good is produced
in equilibrium. There are N +N∗ +1sectors. Good j =0is the numeraire, which is produced
one-for-one from labor. Each nonnumeraire good is produced with labor (which is perfectly
mobile within a country but cannot cross borders) and a speciﬁcf a c t o r ,Kj. Technology is
identical in the two countries. The supply of each speciﬁcf a c t o ri sﬁxed and equal to one in
both countries: ¯ Kj = ¯ K∗
j =1for all j =1 ,...,N + N∗.
For goods j ∈ {1,...,N} ≡ G there is demand only in Home, so these goods are imported by
Home in equilibrium. For goods j ∈ {N +1,...,N +N∗} ≡ G∗ there is demand only in Foreign,
so these goods are imported by Foreign in equilibrium. Under this assumption, for each given
product the exporting country’s standard is irrelevant, so we can focus on standards in the
importing country. This is useful for expositional purposes: our points are more transparent
in a setting where standards in the exporting country are not an issue. In section 4 we will
examine how results change when there is demand also in the exporting country.7
Each good j comes in a continuum of versions. Each version is characterized by the amount
of a (good-speciﬁc) toxic, which can be a poisonous ingredient or a pollutant;8 we let ej denote
t h ea m o u n to ft o x i cp e ru n i to fg o o dj. For example, ej could be the amount of lead contained
in a unit of wall paint, or the level of carbon monoxide emissions from a car, or the amount
of pesticide in an apple, or the amount of nicotine in a cigarette. Producing a safer product is
more expensive; we capture this by postulating the following production function for good j:
yj = Aj(ej)F
j(kj,l j)








ll < 0, ej ∈ [0,1]
(normalization) and Aj is a strictly increasing, smooth function. Further, to help ensure that the
7We could have simpliﬁed further, by assuming that there is no import-competing production. But this is a
complication that we like to have, because we want to be able to talk about national-treatment rules.
8I nt h ec a s eo fap o l l u t a n t ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h i si sr e l e a s e da tt h ea c to fc o n s u m i n gt h eg o o d( a si nt h ec a s e
of automobile emissions). This is slightly diﬀerent from the more standard models of pollution, e.g. Copeland
and Taylor (1994), where pollution occurs at the act of production.
7equilibrium standards are interior, we assume the following boundary conditions: F
j
l (1,0) < ∞,
F
j
ll(1,0) > −∞,A j(0) = 0, 0 <A 0
j(0) < ∞ and A0
j(1) = 0.9











j is the individual consumption of good j, Ej is the aggregate amount of toxic associated
with consumption of good j i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ya n dHj is a damage function that captures
the adverse health eﬀects of toxics. Note that this damage is a pure externality: an individual’s
health depends only on the aggregate amount of toxic Ej.10 Hj is assumed to be smooth and
strictly increasing, with H0
j(0) < ∞. In general the standard on imports may diﬀer from the
standard on domestic producers, therefore we write
Ej = ejyj + e
m
j mj
where yj is domestic production of good j (which is all consumed domestically), mj denotes
imports of good j, ej is the standard on domestic producers of good j and em
j is the standard
for imports. The sub-utility functions uj are smooth and satisfy u0
j > 0, u00
j < 0 and u0
j(0) = ∞.
Since the toxic in a good generates a pure externality, an individual’s demand function will
depend only on the good’s price, not on ej. For this reason, in the absence of regulation ﬁrms
will choose ej =1 . Because of the externality, a government may want to impose a maximum
limit on ej. We will address the endogenous determination of standards later on; for the moment
we think of standards as exogenously ﬁxed.11 We abstract from the possibility of trade taxes;
we will discuss in a later section the robustness of the results to the introduction of trade taxes.
Next we write the utility function for a representative individual in the foreign country.












9All derivative functions are extended by continuity at the frontier.
10A more realistic assumption would be that an individual’s utility depends separately on the aggregate
amount of toxics and on the toxics generated by the individual’s consumption. But this would complicate the
analysis without adding much insight.
11In this basic model we ignore alternative policy instruments that could address this externality, such as







We can now turn to the analysis of the model. We ﬁrst characterize the competitive equi-
librium for given standards, and then endogenize the choice of standards.
First note that wages are given by w = w∗ =1 . We can derive the market equilibrium
separately for each good j.L e tu sf o c u so ng o o d si m p o r t e db yH o m e . T h ea m o u n to fl a b o r
employed by Home in sector j, denoted by Lj, is determined implicitly by:
1=pjAj(ej)F
j
l (1,L j) (2.1)
where pj is the price of good j. We can think of the equilibrium level of Lj as a function of
pjAj(ej), which we denote Lj(pjAj(ej)). Clearly, this function is continuous and increasing.
The amount of labor employed by Foreign in sector j can be derived similarly as a function of
pjAj(em
j ). Given our symmetry assumptions, this is given by Lj(pjAj(em
j )).
The demand function for good j is implicitly deﬁned by u0
j(xj)=pj.W ed e n o t et h i sd e m a n d
function by dj(pj),a n dl e tεd
j ≡− d0
j(pj)pj/dj(pj) denote its elasticity. To simplify the analysis
of the equilibrium choice of standards, we assume that demand is elastic, i.e. εd
j > 1.
Domestic and foreign supply of good j are respectively given by Aj(ej)Fj(1,L j(pjAj(ej)))
and Aj(em
j )Fj(1,L j(pjAj(em
j ))). In equilibrium therefore we must have:
Aj(ej)F





j ))) = dj(pj) (2.2)
This condition determines pj as a function of standards, pj(ej,e m
j ), j ∈ G. Similarly one can
derive the equilibrium prices for goods imported by Foreign, which we denote p∗
j(e∗
j,e ∗m
j ), j ∈ G∗.
It is direct to verify that each price function is decreasing in both arguments. This is intuitive.
Consider for example pj(ej,e m
j ).A ni n c r e a s ei ne i t h e rej or em
j increases supply for two reasons:
a direct increase of productivity (i.e. an increase in Aj), and an increase in labor demand. As
a consequence, the price must fall.
Next we can ﬁnd the equilibrium rate of return for each speciﬁc factor. For goods imported
b yH o m e ,t h i si sg i v e nb yπj (pjAj(ej)) = pjAj(ej)F
j
k(1,L j(pjAj(ej))). Given the symmetry in



















2.1. The noncooperative standards game
We can now turn to the endogenous determination of standards. Each government maximizes
national welfare. Letting sj(pj)=uj(dj(pj))−pjdj(pj) be the consumer surplus for good j,w e
















































We seek to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game in which governments choose
standards simultaneously. Note ﬁrst that, given the separability of payoﬀs, a government’s
optimal choice of standards is independent of the standards in the other country. Hence we
have a dominant strategy equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium standards for a good




[πj(pjAj(ej)) + sj(pj) − Hj(ejyj + e
m
j mj)]




















Generically, these problems have unique solutions, hence the Nash equilibrium is generically
unique.12 Note also that, given our assumptions, the equilibrium (domestic and import) stan-
dards are interior. Our next result states that for each good the importing country imposes
a stricter standard on imported units than on domestically produced units. In other words,
12In what follows we suppose that the equilibrium is unique, but we note that, if there were multiple equilibria,
our results would hold for any equilibrium.
10governments discriminate against foreign producers in the noncooperative equilibrium. The
proof of this and all other results can be found in Appendix.
Proposition 1. At the Nash equilibrium, 0 <e m
j <e j < 1 for all j ∈ G and 0 <e ∗m
j <e ∗
j < 1
for all j ∈ G∗.
To gain intuition for this result, consider starting from a position where ej = em
j .T h e nt h e
importing country can increase its welfare by reducing em
j and increasing ej. Consider a small
variation ∆ej = −∆em
j > 0: the increase in domestic production is approximately compensated
by the decrease in imports and the ﬁrst order eﬀect on price, consumer surplus and negative
externality is null, but the ﬁrst order eﬀect on Home producer surplus is positive.
2.2. Complete-agreement benchmark
Our next objective is to characterize the distortions involved in the Nash equilibrium and
examine how an international agreement can address these distortions.
The signs of the distortions in the noncooperative equilibrium depend on the signs of the
externalities that the importing country’s policies exert on the exporting country. To determine
these signs, let us focus on a good imported by Home. The ﬁrst policy externality to consider is
the eﬀect of the domestic standard on the exporting country, ∂Ω∗
∂ej .S i n c eΩ∗ depends on ej only
through pj,a n dpj is decreasing in ej,t h e n∂Ω∗
∂ej < 0. This implies that the Nash equilibrium
entails excessively lax domestic standards, in the sense that both countries can be made better
oﬀ by tightening domestic standards on all goods.
Next we consider the eﬀect of the import standard on the exporting country, ∂Ω∗
∂em
j .S i n c eem
j
aﬀects foreign welfare only through foreign producer surplus, and this is an increasing function
of pjAj(em
j ),t h e n∂Ω∗
∂em
j > 0 if and only if pjAj(em
j ) increases with em
j .T h i sc o n d i t i o ni se n s u r e d
given our assumption that the demand elasticity is higher than one, εd
j > 1 (see Lemma 2 in
the Appendix).13 Therefore the Nash equilibrium entails excessively strict import standards,
13If demand elasticity is lower than one, foreign producer surplus may be increasing or decreasing in em
j .
Other things equal, it is more likely to be increasing when demand is more elastic, when supply is more elastic,
11in the sense that both countries can be made better oﬀ by relaxing import standards on all
goods. The model can then explain the occurrence of “green protectionism”, which is a frequent
complaint in reality: noncooperative import standards are ineﬃciently strict.
Next we model the bargaining process that leads to an agreement. We assume that agree-
ments are perfectly enforceable.
We consider a bargaining game àl aRubinstein (1982) with alternating oﬀers, assuming that
governments play the one-shot Nash equilibrium standards until an agreement is reached.14 We
will think of the bargaining process as compressed in a small period of time. It is well known
that, as the interval between oﬀers goes to zero, the equilibrium outcome of this game converges
t ot h eN a s hb a r g a i n i n gs o l u t i o nw i t ht h r e a tp o i n tg i v e nb yt h eN a s he q u i l i b r i u ma n dw i t he q u a l
bargaining powers. The reason we model explicitly the noncooperative structure of the game,
rather than adopting a reduced-form cooperative approach such as the Nash bargaining solution,
is that in the next section we will introduce a further element in the bargaining process, namely
the option of invoking arbitration by the DSP, and at that point there will be no ready-made
cooperative bargaining notion to invoke.
The equilibrium agreement is the one that solves the following problem:
max




where ΩNE and Ω∗NE denote the governments’ one-shot Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. Clearly, the
outcome of the bargaining is a point on the Pareto frontier. The exact point selected by the
agreement depends on where the Nash equilibrium point lies relative to the frontier, which in
turn depends on the ﬁne details of the model. The only general statement we can make is
the following: for each good, the equilibrium agreement relaxes the import standard and/or
and when import penetration is lower. We have assumed εd
j > 1 to simplify the exposition and to focus on
(what we think is) the more interesting and realistic case: after all, in reality exporters often complain that
import standards are too strict, they never complain that they are too lax. At any rate, the key insights of the
analysis do not depend on this restriction.
14There may well be equilibria where countries do not play the static Nash equilibrium when an agreement
is not reached. In particular, if the relevant discount factor is high, as we assume below, an eﬃcient outcome
can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium by Nash reversion strategies that never reach a binding
agreement. But since we are assuming that binding agreements can be signed, it seems natural to focus on
externally enforced agreements and hence on strategies playing the static Nash equilibrium whenever a binding
agreement is not reached.
12tightens the domestic standard relative to the Nash equilibrium. This is a straightforward
implication of the argument made above that the Nash equilibrium entails excessively tight
import standards and excessively lax domestic standards.15
3. Incomplete agreements
Thus far we have considered a simple complete-contracting benchmark. Now, to capture the
role of contract incompleteness, we add a further stage to the model. At time t0, the model is
the same as in the previous section. At time t1 a new product appears. This product is drawn
randomly from a large set of potential products, all of which satisfy the assumptions we made
at the outset on technology, demand and externality (including the assumption that demand is
concentrated in one country).16
Governments are ex-ante symmetric with respect to future potential goods. In particular,
for each potential good there is a 50% probability that demand will be concentrated in Home,
so that Home will import the good, and a 50% probability that demand will be concentrated
in Foreign, so that Foreign will import it. Thus we can think of governments as contracting ex
ante under a veil of ignorance. We will later consider the case in which governments are ex-ante
asymmetric.
We suppose that the characteristics of the new product at t1 c a nb ec a p t u r e db yav e c t o ro f
parameters θ.T h i si sa( p o t e n t i a l l yv e r yl o n g )v e c t o rt h a ti n c l u d e sa l lt h er e l e v a n ti n f o r m a t i o n
about the new product, including technology, demand and externalities. Viewed from time t0,
θ is a random variable distributed according to the (common-knowledge) c.d.f. Φ(θ).W ew i l l
use the symbol θ as index of the new good, and let Ωm
θ (resp. Ωx
θ) be the incremental payoﬀ
function associated with good θ for the importing (resp. exporting) country.
15The reason for the “and/or” statement is that we cannot rule out an agreement where, for example, both the
import standard and the domestic standard for a given good are looser than in the Nash equilibrium. Intuitively,
starting from the Nash equilibrium, both countries can be made strictly better oﬀ if all import standards are
relaxed and the domestic standards are not changed. By continuity, a Pareto-improvement can still be achieved
by slightly relaxing some domestic standards.
16In a more complete dynamic model with more than two periods, we would have a stochastic process for the
appearance of new products; however, to the extent that new products tend to appear one at a time, we would
expect our qualitative results to survive.
13The notion of “new” product need not be interpreted literally. Similar results would obtain
if we had a new version of an existing product. For example, suppose at t0 product j comes in
a single, “safe” version e0
j (e.g. non hormone-treated beef) and at t1 an e wv e r s i o neθ
j appears
(e.g. hormone-treated beef), which is cheaper and possibly less safe. Also suppose that it is
eﬃcient to allow sales of version e0
j,w h i l ei tm a yo rm a yn o tb ee ﬃcient to allow sales of version
eθ
j,d e p e n d i n go nθ. Then the model would yield analogous results, with some adaptations due
to the zero-one nature of the policy choice. The “new” product can also be interpreted as an old
product with changed features. For example, suppose at t1 new scientiﬁc evidence is received
about the health damage caused by an existing product j. This means that the H function
associated with this product has changed. In this case we would eﬀectively have a new product
replacing an old one, and the analysis would apply virtually unchanged.
We assume that the agreement at t0 does not cover future products. This assumption can
be justiﬁed in terms of contracting costs. If there is a very large number of potential products
and each of them has a very small probability of appearing tomorrow, then it is more eﬃcient
to wait until tomorrow and write an agreement after the new product has appeared, rather
than writing a complete contingent agreement today.17 Alternatively, one might take the view
that governments are not able to foresee or describe future potential products, in which case
contracting at t0 over future products is not even feasible. We are assuming for simplicity that
governments have in mind a probability distribution over future potential products, but our
main arguments can be extended to a setting of unforeseen contingencies.
At t1, after observing θ, governments get together to bargain over standards for the new
product. To simplify the analysis, we do not allow governments to renegotiate policies for
the old products at t1. This assumption seems reasonable given that (i) in practice there are
important costs of renegotiating agreements and implementing changes in product standards,
and (ii) we interpret the “ex-post” stage of the model as capturing a whole stream of future
stages, so that renegotiating every time would be extremely costly. At any rate, our qualitative
r e s u l t ss u r v i v ee v e ni fr e n e g o t i a t i o ni sc o s t l e s s—m o r eo nt h i sl a t e ri nt h es e c t i o n .
17If we introduced contracting costs explicitly in the model, we would ﬁnd that for suﬃciently high contracting
costs it is optimal to leave some existing products out of the agreement at t0, but this would not change anything
substantial in our conclusions.
14The bargaining process at t1 has the same structure as the one at t0: governments make
alternating oﬀers in rapid sequence, and keep the standards for the new product at their non-
cooperative levels until an agreement is reached (meanwhile the standards for the old goods are
kept at their agreed-upon levels, since there is no renegotiation and agreements are enforceable).
W es u p p o s ef o rt h em o m e n tt h a ti n t e r n a t i o n a lt r a n s f e r sa r en o ta v a i l a b l e ;w ew i l le x a m i n et h e
role of transfers later in the section. We allow governments to randomize the choice of standards
— randomization will play no direct role in the analysis, but it ensures that the set of feasible
utilities is convex.
Given that payoﬀs are separable across goods, and given the no-renegotiation assumption,
we can focus separately on the agreements at t0 and t1.A t t i m e t0, the outcome of the
bargaining is the same as in the previous section. At time t1, the outcome of the bargaining
can be determined focusing on the new good in isolation. The key step is to identify the
location of the threat point, that is, the noncooperative payoﬀ point. Since in a noncooperative
situation the standards for the new good are both chosen by the importing country, it follows
that the threat point is on the Pareto frontier. This in turn implies that the Nash bargaining
outcome coincides with the threat point. In Figure 1, we depict the set of feasible utilities in
the (Ωx
θ,Ωm
θ ) space. Point N, that is, the point that maximizes Ωm
θ , is the Nash equilibrium
and Nash bargaining outcome. Notice that it is not possible to Pareto-improve over the threat
point.
The outcome at t1 is ex-post Pareto eﬃcient, but ineﬃcient from an ex-ante perspective.
This ineﬃciency is due to the incompleteness of the ex-ante agreement. To better understand
the nature of this ineﬃciency, let us derive the ﬁrst-best outcome, i.e. the outcome that would
obtain if governments could costlessly write a complete contingent contract at t0. For the sake
of simplicity, we suppose that Home and Foreign are symmetric not only with respect to future
products, but also with respect to existing products, so that the bargaining problem at t0 is fully
symmetric. In this case, a complete contract at t0 would maximize the governments’ common






θ )dΦ(θ).18 This boils down to
18If countries were asymmetric with respect to existing products, the ex-ante agreement about potential
products could be biased in favour of one country. We will discuss the role of our assumption of ex-ante
symmetry in section 4.
15maximizing Ωx
θ + Ωm
θ , the unweighted sum of the countries’ ex-post utilities, for each potential
product θ. In contrast, under incomplete contracts the outcome maximizes Ωm
θ . Graphically,
the ﬁrst-best outcome is the point on the bargaining frontier that has slope minus one (point
Wi nF i g u r e1 ) .
The nature of this ineﬃciency can be understood in terms of missing issue linkage.T h e
ex-post bargaining problem involves a single issue, which is very asymmetric: the exporting
country has nothing to oﬀer in exchange for more favorable policies by the importing country,
hence no mutual gains are possible relative to the noncooperative equilibrium. With a complete
contract, in contrast, governments can exchange “concessions” across states of the world. Each
state of the world is associated with an “issue,” with a corresponding bargaining frontier. A
complete contract would link all these (potential) issues together, and this beneﬁcial linkage is
what is missing in an incomplete-contracting world.19
3.1. The role of DSP
Next we ask whether an ex post dispute settlement procedure can remedy, at least in part, the
ineﬃciency created by incomplete trade agreements. We think about the DSP in the following
terms: when a new product appears, governments bargain over policies for the new product, but
each government has the option of invoking arbitration by the DSP, in which case the DSP’s
decision is binding. More precisely, we modify the rules of the bargaining game as follows.
G o v e r n m e n t sm a k ea l t e r n a t i n go ﬀers in rapid sequence. At any point during this process each
government has the option of invoking the DSP. If the option is exercised by either government,
the bargaining ends and the DSP immediately issues a determination, which is binding on both
parties. Until an agreement is reached or the DSP is invoked, policies for the new product are
kept at their noncooperative levels. This bargaining game is similar to the bargaining game
“with outside options” as presented by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) (see also the survey by
Binmore et al. (1992)).
19The reader may be tempted to interpret these gains in terms of risk sharing, but this would be misleading.
First, governments are risk neutral in our setting. Second, the gains from issue linkage arise also with linear
utility frontiers, thus they are not due to concavity of the utility frontiers. See for example Sebenius (1983) and
Horstmann, Markusen and Robles (2000) for models of issue linkage in bargaining.
16The DSP, if called upon to arbitrate, makes decisions based on a general principle,t h a ti s
an objective function to be maximized. Given that the ﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m em a x i m i z e st h ej o i n t
surplus Ωx
θ + Ωm
θ , it is natural to assume that this is the DSP’s objective.20 We can think of
governments as incorporating this principle in the ex-ante agreement.
The DSP has less information than the governments about the new product θ and hence
about the welfare functions Ωm
θ and Ωx
θ.21 In particular, if the DSP is invoked it will observe a
noisy signal of θ,s a ys = θ+ε,w h e r eε is a vector of noise terms that, conditional on θ,a r eiid
with mean zero and variance σ2
ε(θ) (thus the noise in the signal can depend on the nature of the
product). We let σ2
ε denote the unconditional variance of each noise term. The iid assumption
is convenient because it allows us to capture the overall imperfection in the DSP’s information
with a single parameter, σ2
ε. The signal s can be interpreted as the information that the DSP
is able to gather through an independent investigation. For the moment we do not consider the
possibility of eliciting information from the governments by setting up a message-based game
(hearing); we will discuss this possibility later in the section. Let Φ(θ|s) be the posterior c.d.f.









where Ωc(e,em,θ) (c = x,m) is the parametrized incremental payoﬀ function of country c for
product θ. Recall our assumption that governments observe θ at t1 before bargaining takes
place. From the governments’ point of view, then, the expected payoﬀ pair resulting from the
DSP’s decision can be thought of as a point in (Ωx
θ,Ωm
θ ) space. If the DSP could observe θ
perfectly, this point would be the ﬁrst-best point (W in Figure 1). But because the DSP’s
information is imperfect, this point is (generically) below the Pareto frontier. Governments
bargain eﬃciently, therefore the equilibrium outcome will still be on the Pareto frontier, but
20We would argue that this is the natural objective for the DSP not only if governments can foresee all
potential products, but also in the case that they cannot, as long as they see themselves as ex-ante symmetric.
What is required is that, for each state of the world, there is another state of the world which is equally likely
and has mirror-image payoﬀ implications. It is not required that governments have in mind a probability
distribution over all possible states of the world.
21The reader may wonder why we did not simplify the model by assuming veriﬁable welfare functions. The
reason is that, if welfare functions were veriﬁable, the ﬁrst best outcome could be easily implemented by a
simple clause of the form “standards must maximize Ωm
θ + Ωx
θ”, as this clause would be perfectly enforceable.
The assumption of nonveriﬁable welfare functions makes the incomplete-contracting problem interesting.
17the DSP in general will not be able to implement the ﬁrst-best point W.22
Before proceeding with the analysis, we pause to discuss our assumption on the behavior
of the DSP. We assumed that, if invoked, the DSP imposes exact levels of standards on the
importing government. We could make alternative assumptions that would be more realistic
but would complicate the analysis without changing the key insights. For example, we could
assume that the DSP determines only whether the (noncooperative) standards currently in
place are acceptable and, if not, in what direction they should be changed; and that the DSP
can be invoked repeatedly.23 We would expect the results to be similar in this case. Note that,
if the disputed standard is of the zero-one type (e.g., the issue is whether or not it is legitimate
to ban hormone-trated beef, as in the example discussed in section 3), then there is no diﬀerence
between this mechanism and the one we assumed.
We can now analyze the bargaining game between the governments. In the presence of the
DSP, we have a game of bargaining with outside options, where the status quo is the one-shot
Nash equilibrium (point N in Figure 1) and the outside option for each player is given by the
DSP expected payoﬀ pair. Again, we look at the limit (subgame perfect) equilibrium outcome
of sequential bargaining as the interval between oﬀers becomes small. It turns out that, if the
DSP point is dominated by point N, then the DSP is irrelevant and the (limit) outcome of
bargaining is still N. If, on the other hand, the DSP gives one of the players a higher utility
than at N, then the equilibrium is the point on the frontier where this player gets the DSP
utility. To understand the eﬀect of the DSP on the equilibrium outcome, we divide the set of
feasible (incremental) payoﬀ p a i r si nt h r e er e g i o n s( s e eF i g u r e1 ) :
Region I: Ωx
θ is lower than at point N.
Region II: Ωx
θ is higher than at point N and Ωx
θ + f(Ωx
θ) is higher than total welfare at N,
22Given that the DSP’s decision inﬂuences the bargaining outcome by creating an outside option, it is possible
that committing strategically to an objective that diﬀers from expected welfare might achieve a higher expected
welfare. However this commitment may not be credible, in the following sense: suppose the DSP selects a judge
to hear the case, and the judge genuinely cares about expected welfare; then, if the dispute subgame is actually
reached, the judge will have an incentive to maximize expected welfare.
23Ac a s eo fi t e r a t i v ed i s p u t e ,w h e r et h eD S Ph a sb e e ni n v o k e dm o r et h a no n c eb yt h ee x p o r t i n gc o u n t r y
because the importing country (allegedly) did not go far enough in changing their standards, is given by the
U.S.-Japan dispute on quarantine regulations for fruit. Outside the area of product standards, the U.S.-E.U.
banana dispute has been a well-known case of iterative dispute.
18where (Ωx
θ,f(Ωx
θ)) is the point on the Pareto frontier with ascissa Ωx
θ.
Region III: Ωx
θ is higher than at point N and Ωx
θ +f(Ωx




DSP) denote the expected DSP point. If (Ωx
DSP,Ωm
DSP) is in region I,t h e
bargaining outcome is N a n dt h eD S Pi si r r e l e v a n t ;i fi ti si nr e g i o nII or III, the bargaining
outcome is (Ωx
DSP,f(Ωx
DSP)); therefore if the DSP point is in region II, DSP improves aggregate
welfare; if it is in region III, the DSP decreases aggregate welfare. Note that the DSP can be
harmful only if, due to imperfect information, the DSP decision is expected to be very biased
in favour of the exporting country. This may well happen if, given the realization of θ,t h eD S P
noise σ2
ε(θ) is high.24
We can now examine the desirability of DSP from an ex-ante standpoint, as viewed from
time t0.A t t0, governments know only the ex-ante joint distribution of θ and ε. Based on
this distribution, they attach some probability to the event that the expected DSP point will
fall in region III for the new product, hence that the DSP will be harmful. This probability
is guaranteed to be small (and possibly zero) if σ2
ε is small. We can conclude that the DSP
improves ex-ante welfare if σ2
ε is suﬃciently low:
Proposition 2. If σ2
ε is suﬃciently low, a dispute settlement procedure increases ex ante eﬃ-
ciency.
In spite of the fact that governments bargain eﬃc i e n t l ye xp o s ta n dh a v em o r ei n f o r m a t i o n
than the DSP, the analysis shows that the presence of the DSP can enhance ex ante eﬃciency,
provided the imperfection in the DSP’s information is not too serious. It is worth summarizing
the logic of this result. Due to the incompleteness of the ex ante agreement, governments fail to
exchange concessions across states of the world. This translates into selecting the “wrong” point
24This statement is easily explained with an example. Suppose potential goods are parametrized by the
marginal externality of consumption, e.g., Hθ(E)=θE, and the prior distribution on θ is concentrated on
intermediate values. Now suppose the realization of θ is extremely high, so that the optimal (common) standard
is very strict. In terms of payoﬀs, point W is close to point N, because the exporting country’s (incremental)
welfare is small at both points. If σ2
ε(θ) is suﬃciently high, countries expect the observed value of θ to be in
the right tail of the DSP distribution Φ(·|s), hence expect the DSP to rule for a permissive standard. But then
the bargaining outcome will be to the far right of point W, at a point where total welfare is lower than at N.
19on the ex-post bargaining frontier in each state of the world. The DSP can partially remedy the
situation by changing the ex-post bargaining outcome in favor of the “weaker” country (which
in our model is the exporting country), which in turn can be achieved by oﬀering this country
a favorable outside option. However, implementing the eﬃcient outcome requires shifting the
ex-post distribution of utilities by the “right” amount, which in turn requires knowledge of the
state of the world. Since the DSP is incompletely informed it cannot achieve full eﬃciency, but
if its lack of information is not too serious it can still increase eﬃciency relative to a DSP-less
world. Notice that the DSP does not intervene in equilibrium: it is the threat of invoking the
DSP that aﬀects the equilibrium outcome.
Intuitively, the value of DSP depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in the ex post
bargaining game. In our basic model, the ex post asymmetry is extreme. We can capture
situations where ex post negotiations are more balanced with a simple extension of the model:
suppose that with probability ρ the new good comes in two symmetric versions, each exported
by one country. Thus the state of the world can be of two types: asymmetric (with probability
1−ρ) or symmetric (with probability ρ). This is a simple way to capture the (expected) degree
of ex post asymmetry with a single parameter (ρ). While this structure is exceedingly simple,
it allows us to make a point that is quite general.
C o n s i d e rt h ee xp o s tb a r g a i n i n gg a m ei nas y m m e t r i cs t a t e . I nF i g u r e2 ,Ωt1 and Ω∗
t1
represent the domestic and foreign incremental payoﬀsa tt1.T h et h r e a tp o i n tN is below the
bargaining frontier. The bargaining outcome in the absence of DSP (point B)i st h ep o i n to f
the frontier that has slope minus one, which maximizes Ωt1 + Ω∗
t1. Thus, in a symmetric state
the possibility to invoke the DSP can only do harm, if it aﬀects the bargaining outcome at all.
It is then immediate to prove the following result:
Proposition 3. Suppose there is a probability ρ that the state is symmetric at t1,a n dσ2
ε is
suﬃciently low. Then the eﬃciency gains from a dispute settlement procedure are decreasing
in ρ.
The intuition for this result is simple: if the ex-post bargaining situation is expected to
be more symmetric, there is less scope for linking issues across states of the world, and hence
20arbitration can oﬀer fewer eﬃciency gains. The condition on σ2
ε is needed because if σ2
ε is high
we cannot rule out the possibility that the presence of the DSP causes harm.
Our basic model depicts the DSP investigation as a pure fact-ﬁnding activity. A comple-
mentary way to gather information about the state of the world θ might be to set up a hearing
where governments can send cheap-talk messages regarding θ. There exists a small literature
on cheap-talk games where two “experts” send messages to a less informed decision maker, the
most prominent examples being Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Battaglini (2002). The results
of these papers suggest that, in a setting where the experts have conﬂicting interests, as in
our model, the decision maker (DSP) may be able to elicit some information from the experts
(governments) but is unlikely to learn the state of the world with certainty.25 This suggests
a reinterpretation of the signal s o b s e r v e db yt h eD S Pi no u rm o d e l :s can be thought of as
incorporating the information that the DSP is able to extract from the hearings, and σ2
ε(θ) can
be interpreted as capturing the DSP’s residual uncertainty about θ after the hearings. The
unconditional variance σ2
ε again captures the overall noise in the DSP’s information as viewed
from an ex ante perspective.
Before proceeding, we want to discuss the notion of “arbitration” in our model. If invoked,
the DSP selects policies according to the principle of joint-welfare maximization. One might
object that in our model the DSP is just “enforcing” a clause of the ex-ante contract that
reads “policies should maximize the joint welfare of the countries.” The reason we do not think
of this process as enforcement is that the countries’ welfare functions are not veriﬁable. By
enforcement we mean that a “court” imposes stiﬀ penalties if a (veriﬁable) rule is violated,
whereas in our model the DSP only oﬀers an outside option to the governments. In this sense,
our model can rationalize the DSP as a genuine arbitrator, not a straight enforcer. This is in
25We can be a little more precise here. The above mentioned papers analyze situations where the state θ and
the policy action of the decision maker are vectors with the same dimension. Negative results (non-existence of
fully revealing equilibria in the hearing game) are obtained in the one-dimensional case with strong conﬂict of
interests (Krishna-Morgan, 2001, Propositions 4 and 5; Battaglini, 2002, Proposition 2). In our model, θ can be
multi-dimensional, but the policy decision is essentially uni-dimensional (it is easy to show that the DSP always
chooses a common standard). The conﬂict of interests in our model is likely to be strong, because the exporting
country prefers the most permissive common standard (it can be shown that π(p(e,e)A(e)) is increasing in e),
while the importing country prefers a much stricter standard. Although our model does not perfectly ﬁtt h e
frameworks of Battaglini and Krishna-Morgan, their results suggest that full revelation would not occur in our
case.
21contrast with the previous theoretical literature on the DSP, in which the DSP is beneﬁcial only
to the extent that it can bring about more severe punishments for violations of the agreements.
Also notice that, in the models that focus exclusively on the enforcement role of the DSP, any
“out of court” settlement by the governments is not desirable, as it diminishes the punishment
for violations. In our model, on the other hand, out-of-court settlement is desirable. Thus, our
model can rationalize a trade institution that facilitates genuine dispute settlement,r a t h e rt h a n
retaliation.
International transfers
Here we consider the case in which international transfers are available. We think of transfers
as occurring in terms of the numeraire good. Consider the bargaining game at t1 in the absence
of a DSP. When transfers are available, the Pareto frontier is the line with slope minus one that
is tangent to the Pareto frontier of the game without transfers. It follows immediately that the
equilibrium policies for the new good are the ones that maximize the joint surplus of the two
governments. This in turn implies that the DSP is redundant in the presence of transfers:
Proposition 4. If international transfers are available, there are no eﬃciency gains from a
dispute settlement procedure.
It is important to highlight that this result depends on the assumption of quasi-linear
utilities. If utility is nonlinear in all goods, or if governments are risk averse, then even if lump
sum transfers are available the ex post bargaining frontier is not linear, and hence a DSP can
provide ex ante eﬃciency gains. What will remain true in a more general model is that the
availability of pure transfers diminishes the potential gains from a DSP.
A remark is in order. It is often argued that monetary transfers are rarely used in interna-
tional trade negotiations, but concessions in other policy areas can play the role of payments.
This idea however is correct only when there are many issues simultaneously on the bargaining
table. This is realistic in the context of a multilateral round of negotiations, but less so in the
context of a single-issue dispute.
22In our model, countries cannot renegotiate standards for the existing products at the stage
of the ex-post dispute. We believe this is a realistic assumption. In the next subsection we argue
that even if governments could costlessly renegotiate all standards at time t1, the qualitative
results would still survive.
Renegotiation of standards on existing products
In the basic model we assumed that it is too costly to renegotiate standards for the old
products at t1.H e r ew eb r i e ﬂy consider the implications of renegotiation on existing products.
We will argue that the DSP may have a role to play even if this renegotiation is costless.
Suppose for simplicity that the bargaining problem at t0 is symmetric, in the sense that
both the Pareto frontier and the threat point are symmetric. Let ΓO be the frontier for the
old products. Clearly, the outcome of the bargaining at t0 is the point on ΓO with slope minus
one. Now suppose that at t1 governments bargain over standards for the new product, and can
renegotiate standards for the old products. Let Γθ b et h ef r o n t i e rf o rt h en e wp r o d u c t .R e c a l l
that, in the absence of renegotiation, the outcome at t1 is the point on Γθ with slope zero.
If governments can renegotiate costlessly, they can achieve a Pareto improvement by moving
the point on ΓO to the left (where the derivative is higher than minus one) and the point on
Γθ to the right (where the derivative is lower than zero). In fact, it is easy to see that the
overall bargaining will yield points on ΓO and Γθ that have equal slopes, and the common slope
will be between zero and minus one (if the two points did not have the same slope, a Pareto
improvement would be possible). But we know that ex-ante Pareto eﬃciency requires that both
slopes be equal to minus one, therefore the outcome of the overall bargaining is not ex-ante
Pareto eﬃcient. It follows that the DSP can provide an ex-ante Pareto improvement, provided
σ2
ε is suﬃciently small.
The intuition is simple: if utilities are nontransferable, ﬁrst-best eﬃciency requires that
governments include in the bargaining not only existing, but also potential, products. Renego-
tiation allows governments to include in the bargain all existing products, but not the potential
products that did not materialize ex-post.
233.2. Rigid rules
There is another potential remedy to contract incompleteness: rigid rules, i.e. blanket rules
that are not product-speciﬁc and apply to any present and future product. To make the
exposition more clear, in this section we focus exclusively on rigid rules, supposing that DSP is
not available. In the next section we will consider the possibility of using both rigid rules and
DSP.
In the case of more traditional trade policies, such as tariﬀs, a focal rigid rule is free trade
for all products. This is the simple solution adopted in free trade areas and customs unions. In
multilateral agreements such as the WTO, rigid tariﬀ bindings or tariﬀ-reduction formulas have
often been adopted (e.g., all tariﬀs in a certain sector are subject to a common tariﬀ binding
of t%,o ra r es l a s h e db yx% relative to pre-agreement levels). One interpretation of these rigid
rules for tariﬀs is that they may serve to cope with contract incompleteness and transaction
costs.
In the case of nontariﬀ barriers, and particularly product standards, there is more limited
scope for rigid rules. Standards are measured in diﬀerent units for diﬀerent goods, and cannot
be speciﬁed in ad-valorem terms. Standards are speciﬁc in nature, and this makes it hard to
impose common bounds on standards for diﬀerent goods. A rigid rule that is adopted by most
existing agreements, and most notably the WTO, is the nondiscrimination principle, which
has two components: (i) a most-favored-nation rule, which requires that import standards for
a given good be the same regardless of the source of imports, and (ii) a national-treatment
rule, which requires that the same standard be applied to imported units and domestically
produced units of each good. Our two-country model is able to capture the second form of
nondiscrimination (ND) rule, which amounts to imposing a constraint ej = em
j for all goods.
The ND rule is not the only feasible rigid rule in our model. A rigid rule in general is a
constraint on (ej,e m
j ) that is independent of the product j. However, if the rule is to specify
unambiguous, veriﬁable obligations, the constraint must be independent of the scale of mea-
surement. This in turn implies that the constraint must be ordinal in nature, because only
ordinal constraints are invariant to monotonic transformations of the measure.
24To derive the set of possible ordinal constraints in our model, consider the following three
types of rule:26
(A) Rules that constrain the ranking between e and em:( A 1 ) e = em;( A 2 )e ≥ em;
(A3) e ≤ em.27 Notice right away that, by Proposition 1, constraint A2 is not binding and
constraint A3 is equivalent to constraint A1. Therefore, we can neglect A2 and A3 without loss
of generality.
(B) Rules that constrain a government to impose no regulation on imported products or
domestic products: (B1) em =1 ;( B 2 )e =1 .28
(C) Rules that constrain a government to impose the strictest feasible standard on imported
products or domestic products: (C1) em =0 ;( C 2 )e =0 . Further rigid rules can be obtained
by combining rules of type (B) and (C) (e.g. e = em =1 ).
We assume that a rigid rule constrains the choices of governments unless they agree to waive
it ex post. Even if the rule is waived ex post, however, it still inﬂuences the ﬁnal outcome by
aﬀecting the status quo in the ex post negotiation.29 We could allow governments to commit
not to waive the rule — but one can easily show that they can never gain from doing this.
One possible approach at this point would be to look for the rigid rule that maximizes ex-
ante welfare. This approach however would be problematic, for two reasons: ﬁrst, the solution
would depend in a delicate way on the details of the probability distribution Φ(θ); second, this
approach does not work if one takes the view that governments cannot foresee all the potential
products. In light of these considerations, we take a “robustness” approach instead: we ask
26Note that even a constraint on the relative standard em/e, for example em/e ≥ r, is not unit-free. (We
owe this observation to Gene Grossman.) This point can be illustrated with an example. Suppose e (em)
is the minimum temperature at which domestic (imported) milk must be processed, and consider a constraint
em/e ≥ 2. This constraint is not unit free, because the value of em/e changes depending on whether temperature
is measured in C0 or F0 degrees. (This example is inspired by a real dispute occurred in 1991 between the U.S.
and Canada within the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement).
27We can ignore strict inequality constraints, because they are either not binding or they cause non-existence
of equilibrium.
28Note that these are indeed ordinal constraints, as they refer to the maximum value of e.A l s o n o t e t h a t ,
even if the maximum value of e were diﬀerent across products, it would still be possible to express the rule in
a non-product-speciﬁc way as “a government should impose no regulation on...”.
29An alternative assumption would be that a rule is enforced only if a country invokes it (e.g., it ﬁles a
violation complaint). In this case, the rule aﬀects the outcome by providing an outside option. Our qualitative
results would still be valid.
25whether there exists a rigid rule that increases ex-ante welfare for any distribution Φ(θ).T h e
next result answers in the aﬃrmative:
Proposition 5. Suppose DSP is not available. Imposing the ND rule is not suﬃcient to
implement the ﬁrst best outcome, but it improves ex-ante eﬃciency for any Φ(θ).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
N Di st h eo n l yr u l et h a ts a t i s ﬁes this property.
The ﬁrst part of the result follows from two observations. First, the ND rule constrains the
choice of standards by the importing country, thus lowering its welfare in case of disagreement.
This shift in the disagreement point increases total welfare, provided the shift does not go too
far. Second, the ﬁrst-best standards satisfy the ND constraint, and this ensures that the shift
in the disagreement point never goes too far. The second part of the result follows from the
observation that, for any alternative rule R,o n ec a nﬁnd a potential product θ such that R
would push the disgreement point too far.
Figure 3 illustrates the ﬁrst part of the result in more detail. Figure 3a depicts the situation
in the (eθ,e m
θ ) space. Point N is the unconstrained Nash equilibrium. The importing country’s
iso-welfare functions are centered around point N. The ND-constrained Nash equilibrium is
point ND. This is the point where the diagonal is tangent with an importer’s iso-welfare function.
The standards that maximize Ωm
θ + Ωx
θ are given by point W. This point is on the diagonal
because the joint-welfare maximizing standards are nondiscriminatory. Drawn in bold is the
eﬃciency locus (where the two countries’ iso-welfare curves are tangent), which runs through
p o i n t sWa n dN .T h eo u t c o m eo ft h eb a r g a i n i n gw h e nt h et h r e a tp o i n ti sN Di sap o i n tl i k e
B ( N D ) ,w h i c hl i e so nt h ee ﬃciency locus and Pareto-improves over point ND. Figure 3b depicts
the situation in the (Ωx
θ,Ωm
θ ) space. The meaning of the labels is the same as in Figure 3a.
Note that the constrained Pareto frontier when the ND rule is imposed is everywhere inside the
original frontier, except at point W where the two frontiers are tangent. Points N and ND are
respectively the peaks of the two frontiers. Point B(ND) lies on the original frontier between
Na n dW ,h e n c ei ti n v o l v e sah i g h e rj o i n tw e l f a r et h a np o i n tN . 30
30The reader may question the realism of one of the model’s predictions, namely that in equilibrium the
negotiated standards do not conform to the ND rule. This might seem at odds with the GATT-WTO’s strict
national treatment principle. It is not clear however that in reality standards always conform to national
26One remark is in order about the robustness of this result. We have proved the result
exploiting the symmetry of Ωm
θ + Ωx
θ with respect to domestic and import standards, which in
turn is due to the assumption of symmetric technology and factor endowments. But intuitively,
even if supply conditions are asymmetric, the ND rule is likely to be beneﬁcial for a large class of
potential products, because it shifts the ex-post balance of power in the right direction, that is
from the importing country to the exporting country. Therefore, we think we have established
a presumption that the ND rule is likely to generate an ex-ante Pareto improvement under
quite general conditions.
3.3. The optimal ex-ante agreement
In this section we allow for a dispute settlement mechanism as well as a rigid ND rule in the
ex ante agreement. In the previous section we argued that the ND rule is the only rigid rule
that can increase ex ante welfare for any probability distribution over future products. Based
on this consideration, we feel justiﬁed in focusing on the ND rule as the only candidate rigid
rule.
Since we assumed that at t0 countries are symmetric with respect to both existing and future
products, we can focus separately on two parts of the ex ante agreement: the part that concerns
existing products and the part that concerns future products. For the former part, the same
analysis as in section 2.2 applies. For the latter part, we have only four options to compare:
(i) a combination of DSP and ND rule, (ii) ND rule alone, (iii) DSP alone, and (iv) neither of
the two. In what follows, with a slight abuse of terminology we will use the word “optimal” to
indicate the best of these four alternatives from the point of view of ex-ante welfare.
T h eN Dr u l ea n dt h eD S Pi n ﬂuence the ex post bargaining outcome in two diﬀerent ways:
t h eN Dr u l ec h a n g e st h estatus quo for the negotiation, while the DSP inﬂuences the outcome
by oﬀering an outside option to the bargainers. Let us study the interaction between these two
eﬀects in greater detail.
treatment. First, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the national treatment rule is easy to get around in
practice. This is even more so if both trading partners agree not to enforce the rule. Second, the GATT-WTO
allows a number of exceptions to the national-treatment rule (e.g. GATT’s Article XX); if two trading partners
want to get around the rule, there is little that prevents them from appealing to some of these exceptions.
27As before, we look at the limit (subgame perfect) equilibrium outcome of sequential bargain-
ing as the interval between oﬀers becomes small. We have two possible disagreement points: the
unconstrained Nash equilibrium N,w h e r et h ep a y o ﬀ of the importing country is maximized,
and the Nash equilibrium NDthat would obtain under the ND rule. We let D denote a generic
disagreement point. In the presence of the DSP, we have a game of bargaining with outside
options, where the status quo is D (a one-shot Nash equilibrium) and the outside option for
each player is given by the expected payoﬀs from the DSP decision. In what follows we refer
to this pair of expected payoﬀs simply as “DSP point”. We let B(D,DSP) denote the cor-
responding bargaining outcome, whereas B(D) is the bargaining solution with disagreement
point D and no outside option. If the DSP point is dominated by point B(D), then the DSP
is irrelevant and the (limit) outcome of bargaining is still B(D). If, on the other hand, one of
the players expects a higher utility from DSP than at B(D), then the equilibrium is the point
on the frontier where this player gets the DSP expected utility.
The DSP point can fall in one of the following three regions of the set of feasible (Ωx,Ωm)
pairs (we omit the subscript θ for simplicity). See Figure 4:
Region I: The payoﬀ Ωx of the exporting country is lower than in B(ND).
Region II: The payoﬀ Ωx of the exporting country is higher than in B(ND) and Ωx+f(Ωx)
is higher than total welfare in B(ND),w h e r e(Ωx,f(Ωx)) i st h ep o i n to nt h eP a r e t of r o n t i e r
with ascissa Ωx.
Region III: The payoﬀ Ωx of the exporting country is higher than in B(ND) and Ωx+f(Ωx)
is lower than total welfare in B(ND).
F i r s tn o t i c et h a t ,i fσ2
ε is low, the DSP point falls in region II with high probability, and in
this case the bargaining outcome is more eﬃcient than in the absence of the DSP (whether or
not a ND rule is in place), hence instituting a DSP is desirable from an ex ante perspective.
Next notice that, if the DSP point falls in region I (i.e., Ωx
DSP < Ωx
B(ND)), having a ND rule is
strictly beneﬁcial. Finally note that, if the DSP point falls in region III, the presence of a DSP
lowers aggregate welfare. However, the probability of the DSP point falling in region III is low
if σ2
ε is low. The next proposition draws the conclusion:
28Proposition 6. If σ2
ε is suﬃciently low and there is a positive probability that Ωx
DSP < Ωx
B(ND),
then the optimal ex-ante agreement has three components: (a) a set of clauses that specify stan-
dards for existing products; (b) a rigid nondiscrimination clause, and (c) a dispute settlement
procedure.
The above result states that, under some conditions on the quality of the DSP’s information,
the DSP and the ND rule are complementary tools for coping with the incompleteness of
agreements. The suﬃcient condition stated in the proposition is somewhat restrictive, but
intuitively the result should hold quite generally. The critical level of σ2
ε below which the DSP
is ex-ante beneﬁcial is likely to be high, and possibly inﬁnite, as we discussed in section 3.1.
On the other hand, the condition for the ND rule to be beneﬁcial is that there is some state θ
for which the expected DSP point falls in region I;t h i si sl i k e l yt ob et h ec a s ei ft h e r ei ss o m e
state θ for which the conditional noise σ2
ε(θ) is suﬃciently high, a rather weak condition.
4. Extensions
In this section we discuss the robustness of the results to some extensions of the model. We start
with the assumption that there is no demand in the exporting country. Let us focus on a new
good. If there is demand in both countries, there are three relevant standards to consider for
this good, two standards chosen by the importing country and one by the exporting country. It
is easy to see that in this case the noncooperative payoﬀ will generally lie below the bargaining
frontier, and the bargaining outcome will be less asymmetric. In other words, the imbalance of
power in favor of the importer will be less pronounced. However, ex-post bargaining will still
generically lead to ex-ante ineﬃcient outcomes, and a DSP will still have a potential eﬃciency
role to play. As for the national treatment rule, our intuition is that it should still be beneﬁcial
under fairly general conditions, since its key eﬀect is that of shifting bargaining power from the
importing country to the exporting country, and this is likely to increase ex-ante eﬃciency.
Next we discuss our assumption that countries are ex-ante symmetric. As a preliminary
remark, we believe that the assumption of “veil of ignorance” is quite reasonable for the purposes
of studying the optimal design of international institutions. Problems of institutional design
29are not dissimilar in this respect from problems of constitutional design, and the assumption
of veil of ignorance is widely used in constitutional design theory. Setting up an institution
such as a DSP is a long term commitment, so if the contracting parties view the future as
very important and very uncertain, the assumption of a symmetric future is not unreasonable.
Further, even if the parties’ present conditions are asymmetric, if they are suﬃciently patient
the considerations about the future will dominate those about the present, and their ex-ante
bargaining powers will be similar. Having said this, the presence of ex-ante asymmetries need
not invalidate the qualitative results of the model. In what follows we discuss this point in
more detail.
The ﬁr s tr e m a r ki st h a taD S Pc o n t i n u e st oh a v ea ne ﬃciency role to play for virtually any
pattern of ex-ante asymmetries. This is not hard to see formally, with a minor notational change
in our basic model. Suppose θ incorporates not only the characteristics of the new product, but
also the identity of the country that exports it. Let Ωθ and Ω∗
θ denote respectively the Home
and Foreign (incremental) payoﬀs. Each state θ is characterized by a bargaining frontier in the
(Ωθ,Ω∗
θ)s p a c e ,w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yΓθ, and a bargaining outcome point Bθ.L e tγθ denote the
absolute value of the slope of Γθ at point Bθ. Absent DSP, if the frontiers Γθ are concave, γθ
will vary across states of the world (generically). But this is ex-ante ineﬃcient, because ex-ante
Pareto eﬃciency requires γθ = γ for all θ.31 As for the role of the DSP, it is clear that if σ2
ε
is suﬃciently small the DSP can improve ex-ante eﬃciency. Suppose for the sake of argument
that σ2
ε is zero, and that the DSP, if invoked, maximizes a weighted aggregate welfare function
of the form γΩθ + Ω∗
θ. This will implement the point on the bargaining frontier with slope −γ
for each θ. It follows that, if γ is chosen appropriately, the DSP can generate an ex-ante Pareto
improvement.
Our second remark is that it may be reasonable to assume that the ex-ante agreement
maximizes the countries’ joint welfare even if countries are ex-ante asymmetric. This will be
the case if standards are negotiated in the context of a comprehensive trade negotiation where
countries discuss many issues simultaneously, so that concessions in policy areas other than
standards can be used as a compensation tool. In this case utility is eﬀectively transferable in
31Intuitively, if there are two states θ
0 and θ
00 such that γθ0
>γ θ00
, one can make a Pareto improvement by
moving the payoﬀ point along the bargaining frontier upwards in state θ
0 and downwards in state θ
00.
30the ex-ante negotiation, even if monetary transfers are unavailable, and as a consequence the ex
ante agreement will maximize aggregate welfare. At the same time, if there are important costs
of renegotiation (as we assumed in our basic model), utility is not transferable in the ex-post
negotiations, hence our results about DSP and the ND rule will still be valid. (Note that in
this case the argument about the DSP in the previous paragraph would apply, and the ex-ante
agreement would set γ =1 .)32
Next we discuss the robustness of our results to political-economy considerations. We dis-
tinguish two diﬀerent ways of formalizing political-economy forces. One is to suppose that
governments maximize an adjusted welfare function that assigns extra weight to the well-being
of politically powerful groups (owners of certain speciﬁc factors), as for example in Grossman
and Helpman (1994). We think this model is a good representation of the process that de-
termines short-run policies, but may not apply equally well to the determination of long-term
policy regimes, such as trade institutions, because industrial lobbies tend to have a short-run
nature (since factors are “speciﬁc” only in the short run). An alternative political-economy
framework, that might be more appropriate for issues of institutional design as in the present
paper, would have governments maximize welfare at the stage of designing the institution, but
anticipate that ex post they will be subject to short-run political pressures.33 What would
happen to our results if we extended the model in this direction is not obvious, but intuitively
the main results should come out strenghtened. First, the presence of ex-post political pres-
sures should increase the potential gains from a DSP, because these pressures tend to increase
the ex-ante ineﬃciency of ex-post bargaining outcomes. Second, the ND rule should be even
more valuable in this case, because ex post political pressures (if they take the form of an ex-
t r aw e i g h ta s s i g n e dt oi m p o r t - c o m p e t i n gﬁrms) will make noncooperative standards even more
discriminatory, hence the ND rule will have more bite.
Thus far we have ignored the possibility of using other policy tools, and in particular taxation
32Even if the ex-ante agreement does not maximize joint welfare, but some weighted sum of the countries’
welfare levels, the qualitative conclusions of the model need not be upset. The DSP would still have an eﬃciency
role to play, as we argued in the text. As for the ND rule, this will still be desirable if the two countries’s weights
are not too diﬀerent. The reason is that this is an all-or-nothing rigid rule. Intuitively, if ex ante asymmetries
are small it is better to have the ND rule than nothing.
33See for example Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) for a theory of trade agreements based on a similar
approach.
31instruments. In our setting, governments would have an incentive to use consumption taxes
to address the consumption externality, and import tariﬀs to distort terms of trade in their
favor. We start by noting that product standards and consumption taxes are complementary,
not alternative, means of addressing the consumption externality; the reason is that there are
two distorted margins in the competitive equilibrium: producers choose the “wrong” versions
of the good (the level of e is too high) and, conditional on the level of e chosen by producers,
consumers buy too much of the good. This implies (it can be shown) that neither one of
t h et w oi n s t r u m e n t si ss u ﬃcient. The question then is whether our results are robust if each
government is allowed to choose, for each good, product standards (e,em), a consumption tax
and a tariﬀ. The full-blown analysis in this case is hard, but one can make some reasonable
conjectures based on the intuitions developed in the basic model. First, in the noncooperative
equilibrium each government will choose discriminatory standards (e 6= em)a n di m p o s et a r i ﬀs;
discriminatory standards and tariﬀs are complementary, not alternative, means of furthering
national welfare at the expense of foreign producers. Second, our results on the optimal ex-ante
agreement (Proposition 6) should remain valid, with the only amendment that the optimal
agreement would specify also a rigid zero tariﬀ for all present and future products.34
Our qualitative results would be aﬀected if tariﬀs and export subsidies were allowed. The
reason is that, if these two tools are used jointly, lump-sum transfers can indirectly be eﬀected
between countries. As a consequence, utility would be transferable in the ex-post bargaining
game, and the outcome would be ex-ante eﬃcient. However, we think this does not invalidate
the points of the paper. First, export subsidies are banned by the WTO, so the relevance of this
argument is limited. Of course it would be desirable to make our points in a model that could
34Here we come back to the question of what can be accomplished with a market-access mechanism àl a
Bagwell and Staiger (2001). As we noted in the introduction, this type of mechanism cannot solve the problems
related to contractual incompletenes. Let us discuss whether it can work in a complete-contracting setting (e.g.
with no future products). Since the international externality associated with standards does not travel simply
through terms of trade (changing a standard aﬀects the exporting country not only through the product price
but also directly), a rule that requires preservation of import volumes will not work. A mechanism that can
implement eﬃcient outcomes actually exists, but is an artifact of the simplifying assumptions of our model.
The mechanism is the following: after tariﬀs have been negotiated, a government is free to change its standards
subject to the constraint that foreign employment is kept constant. This mechanism would work because foreign
employment is linked one-to-one with foreign welfare (we are grateful to Bob Staiger for making this point to
us). However, if we had a more general production function (say y = F(L,K,e), or if there were more than one
mobile factor), no such mechanism would work, because there would be no variable that is linked one-to-one
with foreign welfare.
32also explain the WTO ban on export subsidies, but this would be a much more complicated
model, so we are content with assuming an exogenous export subsidy ban. Second, even if
export subsidies were available, if utility is nonlinear in all goods or if governments are risk
averse, utility would remain nontransferable and our results would remain valid.35
5. Conclusion
As we stated in the introduction, the direct interpretation of our model is in normative terms,
but we believe the model can also contribute to explain some aspects of the observed agreements
on product standards. In this section we discuss whether the predictions of our model are
consistent with the way in which WTO and NAFTA regulate product standards. The approach
taken by NAFTA is very similar to the one taken by WTO (see Sykes, 1995, pp. 108-109), so
we will focus on WTO here.36 Recall that our model predicts a three-part agreement, consisting
of (i) a set of clauses that specify standards for existing products, (ii) a rigid nondiscrimination
rule, and (iii) a dispute settlement procedure.
The WTO endorses a few sectoral agreements that set standards for a variety of existing
products, such as the FAO-WHO Codex Alimentarius, the International Oﬃce of Epizootics
and the International Plant Convention. This is reminiscent of part (i) of the optimal agreement
in our model. Of course the prediction that all existing products are regulated in the agreement
is not realistic, but it would not be hard to bring this prediction more in line with reality, for
example by introducing costs of writing contracts.37 For intermediate levels of writing costs,
the optimal agreement would regulate only some of the existing products.
35Our results could also potentially be aﬀected if tariﬀ-rate quotas were allowed. Suppose that, when the
new product appears, tariﬀ-rate quotas are in place on old products. Then it may possible to eﬀect a lump
sum transfer by varying the within-quota tariﬀ rate on some old product. This argument however is subject
to the same considerations we made for export subsidies (recall that quotas are banned by the WTO), plus an
additional one: if renegotiation costs are high then governments will not want to revise the trade policies on
existing products everytime a new product arises.
36Within the WTO, product standards are subject to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),
signed during the Tokyo Round, and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPM), signed
during the Uruguay Round. Product standards are also subject to articles I, III and XX of GATT. Articles I
and III establish the most-favored-nation and national-treatment principles. Article XX speciﬁes the allowable
exceptions to Articles I and III.
37See Battigalli and Maggi (2002) for a model where contractual incompleteness arises endogenously from the
costs of writing contracts.
33The next remark is that the WTO imposes a blanket nondiscrimination rule (national
treatment and most-favored-nation) that applies to any present or future products. This is
arguably the only substantive rigid rule concerning product standards in the WTO.38
Finally, we want to discuss the predictions of the model regarding the DSP. In the model,
the DSP’s decisions are guided by a principle of global welfare maximization. Alternatively we
can think of this principle as a clause of the agreement stating that product standards should
maximize global welfare, and of the DSP as determining whether the standards in place at the
time of the dispute are consistent with this principle. (Note that we speak of a “principle”
rather than a “rule” because welfare functions are not veriﬁable, hence the application of this
norm requires subjective judgement by the DSP.) The question is then: does the WTO require
that product standards be consistent with global welfare maximization? In what follows we
argue that some of its clauses can legitimately be interpreted in this way.
The WTO requires that standards not be used as disguised restrictions to trade. For exam-
ple, Article 2.3 of the SPM Agreement states: “...Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not
be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.”
This principle of no-disguised-protectionism has been interpreted by several trade economists
as saying that standards should be consistent with global eﬃciency (see Baldwin, 1970, Engel,
1999, Fischer and Serra, 2001, and Ederington, 2001). If one accepts this intepretation, this is
analogous to the principle of global welfare maximization in our model.
Another relevant article is 5.4 of the SPM Agreement, which states: “Members should, when
determining the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, take into account the
objective of minimizing negative trade eﬀects.” This article requires that the standard-setting
country take into account not only its domestic policy objectives, but also the trade-restrictive
eﬀects of standards. And since trade restrictions directly hurt foreign exporters, this article
38We note here that the European Union’s approach to product standards is diﬀerent from that of WTO and
NAFTA. For example, the EU adopts a principle of mutual recognition rather than one of national treatment
(mutual recognition is essentially a transfer of authority over import standards to the exporting country), and
actively pursues a full harmonization of standards. These diﬀerences can probably be explained by the fact that
the EU has reached a much deeper level of economic integration than the WTO or NAFTA. For this reason,
a theoretical understanding of the EU approach would require a diﬀerent model than the one we present here.
Among other things, such a model would have to allow for more sophisticated authority structures, including
the possibility of delegating the choice of harmonized standards to supra-governmental bodies.
34implicitly requires that the importing country assign some weight to foreign exporters when
choosing standards. The article does not say how much weight should be given to foreign
exporters, but we think a legitimate interpretation is that foreign ﬁrms should be given a
similar weight as domestic ﬁrms. Under this interpretation, this article again requires that
standards be consistent with global welfare maximization.
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement states: “...Members shall ensure that technical regula-
tions are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the eﬀe c to fc r e a t i n gu n n e c e s -
sary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulﬁl a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-
fulﬁlment would create...”.39 This article has been the subject of much debate among trade
law scholars. Some of them have interpreted this article as requiring, among other things, a
balancing between national beneﬁts and trade-disruption costs imposed on foreign countries
(see for example Desmedt, 2001, and Marceau and Trachtman, 2002). This is in line with the
norms discussed in the previous two paragraphs.
Overall, the above discussion suggests that the WTO approach to product standards is
broadly consistent with our model, or at the very least, it should suggest that the predic-
tions generated by an incomplete-contracting framework are much closer to reality than those
generated by a complete-contracting approach.
39This principle is echoed in Article 5.6 of the SPM Agreement, which states that “...when establishing or
maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibil-
ity...”
356. Appendix
To simplify the notation, in the proofs we focus on the Home country and we omit the index j
whenever this causes no confusion. We start by proving two preliminary results invoked in the
main text.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium standards are interior: 0 <e<1, 0 <e m < 1.
Proof. Focusing on the Home country, we ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ta tam a x i m u me>0.S u p p o s e
e =0and em = e>0.T h e nH o m ec a ni m p r o v ei t sp a y o ﬀ by setting e = e>0 and em =0 .
In this way aggregate supply, price, consumer surplus and negative externality (H)d on o t
change, but producer surplus increases. Also e = em =0cannot be a maximum because a
slight increase in e increases consumer surplus more than the negative externality (recall that
A0(0) > 0, u0(0) = ∞ and H0(0) < ∞). We can also exclude the extreme values e =1and
em =1 :S i n c eA0(1) = 0 a small decrease in e (em)f r o m1 would have only a second order
negative eﬀect on producer and consumer surplus, but it would have a ﬁrst order eﬀect in
decreasing the negative externality. Finally we need to rule out em =0 .W r i t i n gy = y(p,e),





















Our assumptions 0 <A 0(0) < ∞, 0 <F l(1,0) < ∞ and −∞ <F ll(1,0) < 0 ensure that
0 <y e(p,0) < ∞.A l s o ,n o t et h a ty(p,0) = 0.T h e r e f o r e ,
∂Ω
∂em
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
em=0
= − b Heyp
∂p
∂em
We have just shown that e>0 in equilibrium. Also, it is not hard to show that yp is strictly
positive. Let us examine the sign of
∂p
∂em evaluated at em =0 :
∂p
∂em









which implies em > 0 in equilibrium.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Let (e,em) b et h em a x i m i z i n gc h o i c ef o rH o m e .W eo n l yh a v et os h o wt h a te>em.L e m m a
1 implies that (e,em) 6=( 0 ,0). As argued in the main text, starting from any other point on the
450 line, a small change ∆e = ∆em > 0 has a second order eﬀect on the negative externality and
consumer surplus and a positive ﬁrst order eﬀect on Home producer surplus, thus it increases
Home welfare. This implies that (e,em) is not on the 450 line.
Next we show that if the domestic standard is more strict than the import standard, then
H o m ec a ni n c r e a s ei t sw e l f a r es i m p l yb ys w i t c hing standards. Note that Home and Foreign
have the same production technology and endowments. This implies that the equilibrium price
function p(e,em) and the function E(e,em) ≡ ey(e,p(e,em))+emm(em,p(e,em)) are symmetric
in their two arguments [see equation (2.2)]. Suppose that e = e0 <e 00 = em.B y s w i t c h -
ing standards, the Home government leaves price, consumer surplus and negative externality
unchanged: s(p(e0,e 00)) = s(p(e00,e 0), H(E(e0,e 00)) = H(E(e00,e 0)). On the other hand, Home
producer surplus increases with e: π(pA(e00)) >π (p(A(e0)). Therefore, the maximizing choice
(e,em) must be below the diagonal. ¥
Lemma 2. Since εd > 1, p(e,em)A(e) is increasing in em.

















where Fl, Fll are computed at (1,L(pA(e)) and F∗
l , F∗

























































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Let Ωm
N,Ωx
N be the payoﬀsi nt h eu n c o n s t r a i n e dN a s he q u i l i b r i u m ,Ωm
ND,Ωx
ND the payoﬀsi n
the Nash equilibrium under the ND rule, and Ωm
W,Ωx
W the payoﬀsa tt h eﬁrst-best point W.
F i r s tn o t et h a tΩm
N ≥ Ωm
ND ≥ Ωm
W.T h e ﬁrst inequality holds because the ND rule imposes a
constraint on the importer’s maximization problem. The second inequality follows from the fact
that, given our assumptions, the ﬁr s tb e s ts a t i s ﬁes ND (e = em); therefore the importer’s utility
at W cannot be higher than Ωm




W it follows that the Nash bargaining outcome when the
status quo is (Ωm
ND,Ωx
ND) lies between point N and point W, and therefore (by concavity of
the Pareto frontier) entails a higher ex-ante welfare than the unconstrained Nash equilibrium.
T h a tt h eN Dr u l ei sn o ts u ﬃcient to implement the ﬁrst-best outcome is obvious.
The second part of the result can be shown by exhibiting, for every alternative rule R,a
parameter vector θ such that the induced bargaining equilibrium is either on the left of B(ND)
or far on the right of W.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
F i r s tn o t et h a t ,i fσ2
ε is small, having a DSP is better than having nothing. Also, Proposition
5 implies that a simple ND rule is better than nothing. Therefore we only have to compare
the simple DSP and ND rules with the composite ND+DSP rule. If there is no ND rule and
DSP =( Ωx
DSP,Ωm
DSP) falls in region I, the bargaining outcome B(N,DSP) will be either N (if
Ωx
DSP is lower than in N)o rt h ep o i n t(Ωx
DSP,f(Ωx
DSP)). In both cases the ND+DSP rules turns
38out to yield a higher aggregate welfare: since DSP is in region I then B(ND,DSP)=B(ND).
If DSP falls in region II or III the bargaining outcome with the DSP outside option is
(Ωx
DSP,f(Ωx
DSP)) whether or not the ND rule is in place. The ND+DSP rule yields a higher
a g g r e g a t ew e l f a r et h a nt h es i m p l eN Dr u l ei nr e g i o nII and a lower aggregate welfare in region
III. We conclude that the ND+DSP rule is at least as good in terms of aggregate welfare as
the simple DSP rule, and strictly better if DSP falls in region I. Whether or not the DSP rule
is worth adding to the ND rule from an ex ante perspective depends on the probability of a
DSP point falling in the “extreme” region III. If this probability is suﬃciently low then the
ND+DSP rule is optimal. But this is ensured if σ2
ε is suﬃciently low.¥
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Figure 4. Nondiscrimination Rule and DSP